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Abstract: 
Mineral prospecting and raising finance for ‘junior’ mining firms has 
historically been regarded as a speculative activity.  For the regulators of 
securities markets upon which ‘junior’ mining companies seek to raise 
capital, a perennial problem has been handling not only the indeterminacy 
of scientific claims, but also the social basis of epistemic practices.  This 
paper examines the production of a system of public warrant and 
associated knowledge practices intended to enable investors to 
differentiate between ‘destructive’ and ‘productive’ varieties of financial 
speculation.  It traces the use of the notion of ‘disclosure’ in constructing 
and legitimizing the ‘juniors’ market in Canada.  It argues that though the 
work of ‘economics’ may be necessary in the construction of markets, it is 
by no means sufficient.  Attention must also be given to the ways in which 
legal models of ‘the free-market’ can be translated and constantly re-
worked across the sites and spaces of regulatory practice, animating the 
geographies of markets.   
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Abstract 
 
Mineral prospecting and raising finance for ‘junior’ mining firms has historically been 
regarded as a speculative activity.  For the regulators of securities markets upon which 
‘junior’ mining companies seek to raise capital, a perennial problem has been handling not 
only the indeterminacy of scientific claims, but also the social basis of epistemic practices.  
This paper examines the production of a system of public warrant and associated knowledge 
practices intended to enable investors to differentiate between ‘destructive’ and ‘productive’ 
varieties of financial speculation.  It traces the use of the notion of ‘disclosure’ in constructing 
and legitimizing the ‘juniors’ market in Canada.  It argues that though the work of ‘economics’ 
may be necessary in the construction of markets, it is by no means sufficient.  Attention must 
also be given to the ways in which legal models of ‘the free-market’ can be translated and 
constantly re-worked across the sites and spaces of regulatory practice, animating the 
geographies of markets.   
 
 
Key words:  finance, mining, Canada, knowledge practices, geographies of marketization 
  
Page 1 of 22 Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 2 
 
 
Introduction 
  
In 2004 the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) set up an international project 
to research financial reporting practices for the extractive industries, encompassing 
exploration, evaluation, development and production activities.  The project team drew 
together staff from the national accounting standards setters of Australia, Canada, Norway 
and South Africa, who were tasked with developing a framework for the harmonisation of 
accounting, valuation and disclosure models for non-regenerative resources.  In prefacing 
their recommendations, the project team noted that ‘extractive activities are subject to 
several significant uncertainties.  During exploration it is common to have insufficient data to 
evaluate whether a deposit of minerals or oil and gas will be developed and will generate 
future net cash inflows from extraction and sale … these uncertainties revolve around the 
quantity … that can be extracted given the geological, technical and economic conditions. … 
[Moreover] there is no direct relationship between the risks and rewards of a particular 
exploration programme’ (IASB 2010, 15).  Indeed, historically financing mineral exploration 
firms has been regarded as a highly speculative activity.  In part this stems from what Braun 
(2006) has characterised as ‘the intransigence of nature’ (p.202), the ways in which the 
physical qualities of geological phenomenon pose particular barriers to commodification 
processes.  However, it also stems from how those promoting the sale of shares in 
exploration companies exploit in an entrepreneurial fashion the articulation of prospectors’ 
provisional knowledge claims with a range of culturally specific sets of commitments and 
practices, ‘conjuring’ economic potential, animating speculative capital flows (Tsing 2005). 
Consequently, for market participants a perennial problem has been not only handling the 
indeterminacy of scientific claims based upon field surveys, exploration drilling, chemical 
assays and inference, but also the social basis of these epistemic practices (Schaffer 2002).  
This paper examines the construction of a regime to standardize the disclosure and 
circulation of information considered material to the valuation of shares in these sorts of 
enterprises, that is, the production of a system of public warrant and associated knowledge 
practices intended to enable investors to differentiate between ‘destructive’ and ‘productive’ 
varieties of financial speculation (Preda 2009).  It focuses on the world’s largest equity 
market (by number of listings) for mineral exploration or ‘junior’ mining firms – Canada – 
tracing the use of the notion of ‘disclosure’ in the construction and legitimization of this 
market.   
 
The rule of markets 
 
In a recent review of the ‘geographies of markets’, Berndt and Boeckler (2010) have argued 
for more research on ‘how exactly markets and other economic entities are put to work’ (p. 
599). Driving this project is concern that markets are too often taken-for-granted in 
geographical scholarship and the social sciences more generally.  Over the past ten years 
transdisciplinary scholarship has eschewed notions of ‘the market’ and begun to view 
markets as bundles of practices and material arrangements always in the making (Callon 
1998; MacKenzie 2006; Mackenzie et al. 2007).  This work has queried the processes 
through which particular ideas, objects and spaces are qualified as ‘economic’, directed our 
attention to the processes by which markets are constituted through particular socio-
technical arrangements and problematized how market orders emerge and expand (Caliskan 
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and Callon 2009; 2010).  As recently acknowledged, common threads that bind together 
much of this research on ‘geographies of marketization’ are the ‘concrete translation 
processes which see to it that economic and social realties are brought into line with 
laboratory conditions, in so doing allowing the radical project of neoclassical economics to 
realize itself’ (Berndt and Boeckler 2011, 1058).  In understanding these translation 
processes, emphasis has been placed on the role of economists (whether ‘confined’ or ‘in 
the wild’) and things (‘market devices’) (Callon et al. 2002; MacKenzie et al. 2007, 311-357).  
As a consequence, this paper argues, often glossed over is the significance of the ‘methods 
of control and trials of strength’ (Mitchell 2007, 245) embedded within the design and 
deployment of ‘economic’ arguments and calculations.  Though the work of ‘economics’ may 
be necessary in the construction of markets, it is by no means sufficient (see Mitchell 2002; 
Parry 2004; Blomley 2008; Mansfield 2008).  Emphasis on ‘economics’ and associated 
calculative arrangements alone often takes much for granted in the workings of private 
regimes of self-regulation, their relationship with the state and wider legal processes in 
shaping market-like rule.   
 
For example, MacKenzie’s (2001; MacKenzie and Millo 2003) path-breaking discussion of 
option pricing and the development of modern financial markets, casts necessary moral and 
legal boundary work as points of departure.  Outlining the social, cultural and political 
‘conditions of felicity’ that explain the Black-Scholes-Merton model’s success at the Chicago 
Board Options Exchange, MacK nzie places emphasis on the growing authority of 
economics, the model’s cognitive simplicity and its material means of calculation (MacKenzie 
et al. 2007, 54-86).  The on-going boundary work within regulatory structures to manage 
distinctions between private and public information (animated by notions of ‘fairness’) and the 
legitimacy of market-making practices (as forms of ‘destructive’ or ‘productive’ speculation) is 
assumed to be fait accompli.  As a consequence, lost are the variety of ways in which legal 
models of ‘a free market’ can be translated and constantly re-worked across the sites and 
spaces of regulatory practice into governing norms, statutory provisions, institutional 
arrangements and associated calculative possibilities – that is, the generative power of law 
(Riles (2011). 
 
In the sections that follow, the paper traces the enrolment of ‘disclosure’ into the Canadian 
capital market and associated debate over what it means in practice, i.e. what ought to count 
or be considered ‘material’ in the valuation of shares. As will be discussed shortly, practical 
investments by the state and industry participants in a disclosure regime were animated 
largely by what investors perceived as ‘the Canadian problem’ – fraud associated with the 
marketing of speculative shares in mineral prospecting firms.  The construction of a system 
to govern the circulation of ‘material’ information proved necessary to legitimise this form of 
financial speculation, yet in doing so established a template for Canada’s wider capital 
market.  From the case study it is evident that ‘disclosure’ can be put to work in a number of 
ways.  How legal processes frame epistemic practices, translating legal models of ‘a free 
market’ into standards and statutory requirements, can have a bearing on what forms of 
governance are brought into being and the kind of economy set in motion.  Over time 
disagreement among market participants in Canada over what ‘disclosure’ ought to mean for 
financing mineral prospecting did not yield a space of convergence, centred on a shared 
understanding built up over the course of transactions.  Even though ‘disclosure’ may appear 
as a technical given, in fact it has functioned more like a ‘trading zone’ (Galison 1997), a 
socio-technical space in which divergent understandings and commitments towards the idea 
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circulate, facilitating in a generative fashion the work of market coordination and 
legitimization in different temporal and socio-spatial configurations.   
 
The remainder of this paper first traces Canada’s importance as a place for raising equity 
finance for junior mining and the context in which disclosure regulations were first introduced.  
It then identifies three shifts in how regulators made sense of ‘disclosure’ in practice.  These 
shifts reframed the significance of disclosure for the prevention of fraud: first, in terms of the 
well-being of mineral exploration and resource development; then, wider processes of 
industrialization; and finally, promoting ‘knowledge industries’ within the global economy.  
Each shift re-drew boundaries that demarcate flows of private information controlled by 
mining promoters from what are deemed ‘material’ to the valuation of shares and so should 
be publically available within the market making process.  These shifts in interpretational 
practice had consequences for the governance of both issuing firms and the markets they 
listed upon.  As such, the technical qualities of disclosure requirements were profoundly 
political (Mitchell 2007; Riles 2011).  In the Canadian example, ‘disclosure’ gained traction 
through contingent associations forged with scale-making projects of: first, province-building; 
then, the construction of a national space economy; and finally, securing Canada’s place 
within a global economy.  This case study suggests that the power of the idea of disclosure 
resides less in an idealized notion of some sort of self-executing means of economic 
regulation, than in the situated politics of calculation it puts in place.  Attention to the 
geographies of the institutions, actors, ideas and material practices that constitute these 
sorts of legal knowledge practices can greatly enrich our understanding of the situated logics 
and imperatives that animate the variegated landscape of contemporary capitalism (Peck 
and Theodore 2007).  
 
Canada & resource exploration 
 
Canada has long been recognised as a leader in mining and its financing. Fifty-seven per 
cent of the world’s public mining companies are listed on the Toronto-based TMX Group of 
securities exchanges, over twice as many as its nearest foreign rival, the Australian Stock 
Exchange (TMX 2010).  Most of these mining issuers are exploration companies with no 
financial interest in a producing mine.  They focus on finding promising locations, evaluating 
the site to determine if is economically viable (i.e. ‘proving’), securing the rights to the 
materials (i.e. ‘staking’) and developing a mine for production.   These activities are non-
revenue generating with an uncertain pay-off.  As Tsing (2000) has argued, in such 
‘speculative enterprises, profit must be imagined before it can be extracted’ (p.118) and so ‘in 
this industry, the line between various kinds of expertise is thin: geologists (with salaries 
supplemented by stock options) must be promoters to raise the money to finance their 
mineral finds, market analysts must be geologists to evaluate those finds, and stock 
promoters must explain their offerings in geologically convincing terms’ (p.123).  Junior 
mining contrasts with the activities and risks undertaken by ‘the majors’ or senior mining 
companies, a relatively smaller number of large multinational firms that concentrate on 
mineral production, processing and marketing activities.  The latter dominate the mining 
listings in markets centred in New York and London, where the average quoted market 
capitalisation for a mining firm is $11.3 billion (NYSE/AMEX) and $3.4 billion (LSE/AIM) 
respectively.  On the TMX group of exchanges, by comparison, the figure is only $0.4 billion.   
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 5 
Canada’s significance as a place in which to raise capital for junior mining ventures can be 
traced back to mineral finds in the 1890s in the Rocky Mountains of British Columbia, and 
later in the Pre-Cambrian Shield of northern Ontario (Armstrong 1997).  These discoveries 
served to popularise trading in highly speculative ‘penny stocks’.  Growing public interest in 
these types of shares drew upon prior investments by scientists, commercial interests and 
the state in constructing what Braun (1997, 2000) has described as a ‘geological vision’ of 
the new country.  The Geological Survey of Canada’s (GSC, established 1842) regular 
output of reports, sketches and maps won praise nationally and internationally as reliable 
guides to mining enterprise.  These publications amounted to more than the enumeration of 
Canada’s mineral wealth.  Rather, they were part of broader efforts by provincial and federal 
governments to generate a geologically literate public at home and abroad, presenting 
investment opportunities in Canadian mining as an ‘as an exercise in reason, rather than 
speculation’ (Braun 2000, 31).  
 
Under the terms of Canadian confederation, powers over land and resources were ceded to 
provincial governments.  It was left to provincial legislatures and their administrative agencies 
to determine how to regulate the distribution, use and financing of what were now cast as 
Canada’s ‘mineral lands’.  Legislation emerged in the wake of gold rushes in California 
(1849), Australia (1851) and New Zealand (1857), mirroring those jurisdictions’ ‘free entry 
system’ (Leshy 1987; Bakken 2008).  This separated surface from sub-surface property 
rights, privileging mining interests over and above other pre-existing claims to the land, 
whether indigenous or settler (Barton 1993).  Dis-entangling sub-surface property rights from 
other claims was regarded by state officials as necessary as providing physical infrastructure 
(roads, railways and ports) in promoting investment in the ‘resource frontier’ (Ontario 1890).  
Together, geological and legal practices made legible to power a space of administration, 
advancing the frontiers of the Canadian state (Zaslow 1975), configuring the imagined 
geographies of a transcontinental nation (Zeller 1987; Baldwin, Cameron and Kobayashi 
2011) and incorporating new territories into imperial forms of political and economic 
calculation (Stafford 1990).  
 
As the state harnessed both private initiative and its own resources to administer its 
territories as a geological resource, financiers in Toronto and Montreal seized upon the 
opportunity to promote the sale of ‘penny’ shares in mineral exploration companies.  On the 
trading floors of the cities’ stock exchanges (founded in the 1870s), penny stocks were sold 
alongside opportunities to invest in banks, insurance companies, railroads and utilities, 
seeming to guarantee in the minds of investors the liquidity of mining investments.  Whereas 
shares in banks and utilities commanded prices beyond the reach of most salaried workers 
and wage earners, penny mining stocks offered many the prospect of handsome dividends 
and capital gains if there was a rich strike of minerals.  Armstrong (1997) notes that most 
investors in junior mining ventures at this time ‘knew little and cared less about geology or 
mineralisation, but all were eager to get in on the ground floor and ride a stock for as much 
profit as they could’ (p.27).  By the 1920s low-priced shares in ‘juniors’ came to serve as 
vehicles for extending share ownership beyond the ranks of the financial elite, drawing in 
retail investors from across North America.  However unscrupulous sales techniques, false 
and misleading claims and share price manipulation quickly earned mining promoters and 
their brokers operating out of Toronto international notoriety.  In the wake of the Wall Street 
Crash, one of the first initiatives the United States’ Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) undertook was to address what had become known as ‘the Canadian problem’: the 
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 6 
unlicensed cross-border marketing through letters, telegram wires and telephone calls of 
highly speculative unregistered Canadian mining shares.  The high-pressure sales 
techniques of Toronto’s boiler rooms sought to capitalize upon the staging of Canada as a 
‘resource frontier’, conjuring the prospect of wealth from the spaces in between the drill holes 
that animated revisions to the GSC’s Geological Map of Canada (1869).   
 
By the late 1930s, exploitation of prospectors’ knowledge claims by Toronto’s boiler rooms 
and a series of scandals involving the salting of drill hole cores, severely eroded public 
confidence in Canada’s capital markets and its mineral exploration firms in particular.  A 
sustained publicity campaign by the SEC and non-profit Better Business Bureau to stem the 
flow of marketing communications and mining shares across the U.S. border helped push 
Ontario’s government to convene a Royal Commission on Mining (Ontario, 1944).  Canada’s 
dependence on external investment to fund its economic development, in particular from U.S. 
residents, figured prominently in the Commission’s deliberations.  Significantly, its report 
linked promoting the mining industry with fraud prevention.  It argued that existing securities 
legislation should be repealed as it had a ‘retarding influence’ on mining in failing ‘to solve 
the problem of preventing fraud in the sale of securities’.  It concluded that fraudulent activity 
had reached ‘serious proportions’, ‘hampering the financing of legitimate mining 
development’. 
 
Making space for disclosure 
 
Until this point the prevention of securities fraud relied upon the by-laws and initiative of stock 
exchanges and the investigative powers of each province’s Attorney General.  In 1928 
Ontario passed the Security Frauds Prevention Act (SFPA), requiring the registration of all 
brokers and salespeople, empowering courts to suspend them where fraud was proven and 
strengthening the Attorney General’s powers.  However, reliance on the latter’s resources 
and the burden of proof required by the courts proved largely ineffective (Armstrong 1997).  
Further public resources were directed at the issue in 1931, with the creation of a specialized 
tribunal to enforce legislation, eventually named the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC).  
Yet reliance upon the deterrence of well publicized investigations, broker registration and 
self-regulation was evidently not adequate to address ‘the Canadian problem’.   
 
Recognising the moral and political challenges that threatened to stem new financings, the 
Royal Commission on Mining argued that public confidence in mining securities depended on 
some form of assurance that market practices could be trusted as ethical.  It suggested this 
assurance should be provided by regulation; interventions to ensure the public be given ‘a 
fair run for its money’.  It advocated measures to govern the circulation of knowledge among 
prospectors, their promoters and the investing public; measures that would ‘demand 
personal integrity and financial responsibility’ of brokers and ensure ‘the reasoning person’ 
had access to ‘all the important facts’ considered necessary to judge a share’s worth in 
relation to his or her best interests.  The specific regulatory strategies recommended were, 
firstly, a new form of registration for brokers requiring applicants to provide evidence that 
they met ‘the ordinary standards’ for ‘fair dealing’ and, secondly, a requirement that issuers 
circulate a standardized prospectus before any new issues are sold to the public, disclosing 
key information in advance of a company’s initial public offering (IPO). 
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 7 
As a regulatory ideal, ‘disclosure’ is grounded in legal constructions of ‘fairness’ or ‘equity’ 
and rooted in a longer standing belief in the goal of transparency, the struggle for which is 
considered a hallmark of liberal government (Scheppele 1988; Sunstein 1990; Sarra 2007).  
As a regulatory technique, disclosure was championed in the early twentieth century by legal 
realists such Brandeis (1914), Berle and Means (1932) and Frankfurter (1933), and became 
the cornerstone of the U.S. securities regulatory framework established under Roosevelt’s 
New Deal (Williams 1999; Wang 2010).  For Brandeis, ‘disclosure’ was a means to an end – 
a regulatory strategy that could bring pressure to bear from shareholders and the wider 
public on the activities of powerful market insiders.  This, according to Berle and Means, 
would make those who hold economic power more accountable.  Frankfurter, who was 
instrumental in guiding the Securities Act (1933) through Congress, argued publicity could 
transform the ‘competence and character’ of corporate managers, bankers and accountants, 
as ‘many practices safely pursued in private lose their justification in public’ (1933, 55).   
Disclosure, he maintained, was ‘essential to a fair judgment upon the security offered’ (op. 
cit.), enabling the public to efficiently and accurately value securities, thereby affecting 
‘business morals’.  In contrast to past reliance on deterrence-based measures, this marked a 
critical departure in market governance, placing a legal responsibility for the public circulation 
of accurate, timely ‘material’ information in the hands of market insiders. 
 
Whereas in the United States the introduction of mandatory disclosure was framed in terms 
of making those who hold economic power more accountable, in Canada it was introduced a 
decade or so later with a very different frame of reference.  It was the Royal Commission on 
Mining (1944) that successfully advocated its introduction, arguing that adapting U.S. 
practice was necessary to shore up confidence among investors in financing the 
development of Canada’s resource economy.  Further to this end, whereas in the United 
States the SEC was granted sweeping discretionary powers, advancing the regulatory state 
(Rittich 2005), in Canada the Commission argued the OSC’s powers be clearly defined, 
curtailed and limited to the administration of government policy, namely promoting resource 
development (Coleman 1994; Condon 1998).  If the OSC controlled the terms of entry to the 
brokerage profession and had oversight of the production and circulation of information at the 
point of initial public offering (IPO), it was envisaged that the market itself would govern the 
flows of information and sales practices in a self-executing fashion.  For Ontario these 
measures intended to displace moral and political concerns with utilitarian ones (economic 
development), while making legible to state administrators elements of the market making 
process. 
 
The credibility of Ontario’s mining industry loomed large as an organising principle for 
provisions within the province’s Securities Act (1945).  However, contrary to the spirit of the 
Commission’s report, the OSC was offered no guidance in the legislation on how to 
determine ‘the integrity’ of those who applied to be registered as brokers, nor what 
constituted ‘full, true and plain disclosure of all material facts’ in a prospectus.  Rather, in 
transferring jurisdiction for securities regulation from the courts to an administrative agency 
(i.e. the OSC), the new Act granted the agency substantial discretionary powers to pursue its 
standard-setting task and statutory mandate (Baillie 1965).  This said, the legislation also 
demonstrated continued faith in the self-regulatory capacities of recognized stock exchanges.  
The Act provided for members of exchanges and issuers listing on them to be exempted 
from OSC regulatory scrutiny (Coleman 1989).   As Barkan (2011) notes, states have long 
granted such legal privileges in business, trade and finance to promote and maintain 
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 8 
particular regimes of accumulation.   Consequently, what amounted to a form of ‘regulatory 
expansion’ (Levi-Faur 2005), not only included the creation of a regulatory agency and 
development of new technologies of regulation through rule making and enforcement, but 
also ring fenced from state oversight those market-making activities controlled by self-
governing bodies.  This approach mirrored that pioneered in the United States by the SEC a 
decade earlier, conceiving of the task of regulators as stimulating self-regulatory vigilance 
where there was scope for extreme opportunism (Abolafia 1996; Seligman 2003).  In seeking 
to ‘clean up’ the financing of Ontario’s junior mining sector, the provincial legislature had 
established a template for the governance of securities markets in general, one that other 
Canadian provinces soon emulated.  
 
Making sense of disclosure 
 
With the passage of Ontario’s Securities Act (1945), the newly empowered provincial 
regulator set about working with other stakeholders to translate the idea of ‘disclosure’ into 
procedural norms, seeking to codify existing practices as standards to govern the circulation 
of information.  Significantly, its initial deliberations over the practical meaning of ‘full, true 
and plain disclosure’ pivoted around what the agency understood to be its role in realising 
provincial government policy.  Early decisions and judgments by the OSC over what should 
and could not be circulated within a prospectus accorded greater significance to the 
language of risk-taking in the interests of economic development rather than paternalistic 
investor protection.  As Hess (2007) notes, there is a politics to knowledge dissemination.  
For example, an article in the OSC Bulletin (April 1949) stated, ‘if the basic concept of the 
administrative authorities is that the public should never risk capital but only embark on “sure 
things”, there is good reason to believe that exploration and primary development would 
either cease or become the sole right of the big companies.  On the other hand, the public 
can participate and enter into these speculations with eyes wide open and with full 
knowledge of all material facts, where a prospectus of the type required under our type of 
securities legislation is required’ (quoted by Condon 1998, 30).  Consequently, given the 
uncertainties such enterprises managed and the how the OSC understood its mandate, the 
regulator initially viewed its role in policing the circulation of information as quite limited. 
 
The OSC’s framing of disclosure resonated with a widely held notion that most of country’s 
great mineral finds had been made by lone prospectors pursuing hunches, each embodying 
what society could gain from speculation, enterprise and scientific exploration.  For example, 
in 1939 at the annual meeting of the Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada 
(PDAC), a mining executive repeated often rehearsed praise of the entrepreneurial virtues of 
independent prospectors and their collective contribution to the nation’s prosperity, arguing: 
‘let the government recognize prospecting for what it is: an out-right gamble … Surely it is 
better that a man should gamble on a prospect than on a racehorse or an Irish Sweepstake.  
On this, if you lose, you lose.  When money is gambled on prospects, if you lose, that money 
stays in Canada and more is known about mining country’ (quoted in Armstrong 1992, 98).  
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s junior mining firms, financiers and their regulators framed 
controversies over the knowledge claims circulated in company prospectuses, the media and 
cold calls in terms of productive speculation, province building and knowledge making.  In 
doing so, they sought to displace moral and political anxieties about the culture of investing 
in mineral exploration with notions of a national spirit and its wider economic and scientific 
significance (cf. Preda 2009).  However, as Armstrong (2001) details, waves of fraudulent 
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 9 
‘drill hole’ promotions continued to threaten the sector’s fragile reputation, undermining 
confidence in the country’s capital markets at large.  At one point in 1964 three public 
enquiries were concurrently investigating various aspects of the financing of exploration 
activities (see Canada 1964; Ontario 1965a; 1965b).  A common thread that traversed each 
of these was the subject of disclosure, in particular the ability of shareholders and other 
investors to access accurate and timely ‘material’ information.    
 
Illustrative of this was a scandal that involved the president of PDAC, Viola MacMillan (see 
Ontario 1965b; Condon 1998; Armstrong 2001).  In 1959 a major American mineral producer, 
Texas Gulf Sulphur, began a systematic aerial geophysical survey and drilling programme of 
the Precambrian Shield around Timmins, Ontario.  In April 1964 it issued a press release in 
New York announcing it had discovered a significant ore body (copper, zinc and silver) and 
had secured mineral rights for the surrounding properties.  On hearing the news, Viola 
MacMillan made a locational bet, purchasing from local prospectors a claim surrounded on 
three sides by Texas Gulf lands and selling the claim to a company she and her husband 
controlled - Windfall Oils and Mines.    By July the MacMillans had a drill team on site and 
rumours began to circulate about the value of minerals it had discovered, fed in part by 
misleading statements, unusual halts in the drilling programme and unexplained delays in 
sending the cores to an assay laboratory.  The MacMillans groomed the market for Windfall 
shares, even though they knew as early as July 6th that the drill cores contained nothing of 
commercial value.  However, optimistic statements released to the press, the theatrics of a 
fitful drilling programme and the circulation of rumors encouraged investors to speculate on 
the future value of the company’s mineral claims.  By July 30th, when assay results were 
finally made public and the stock price collapsed, the MacMillans and other insiders had 
netted over $1 million (Canadian) from the disposal of their shares.   
 
Re-mapping the institutional basis of warrant 
 
The Windfall scandal highlighted shortcomings in existing practices of self-regulation and the 
inadequacies of a system of disclosure that relied upon only the point of primary distribution 
of shares.  Two major reviews of banking, finance and securities legislation undertaken at the 
time, one federal (Canada 1964) and the other provincial (Ontario 1965a), found that existing 
arrangements did not provide investors with an adequate amount of information.  In addition, 
the Windfall affair exposed to public scrutiny the ways in which mining promoters marketed 
shares in the secondary market, manipulating prices through the carefully timed 
orchestration of well crafted rumours, leaks and official press releases. The Windfall enquiry 
(Ontario 1965b) concluded that this was commonplace, arguing a key issue was the 
accuracy of information.  The report went so far as to characterise the membership of the 
Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE), Canada’s primary securities exchange, as ‘a private gaming 
club’ (Ontario 1965b, 97) maintained for the benefit of insiders.  This highlighted a persistent 
problem with the institutional basis of warrant established under the Securities Act (1945); 
allocating responsibility to self-governing bodies for ensuring the accuracy of information 
circulated to investors on exchange-listed stocks.  
 
Exemptions granted to stocks listed on the TSE had served to marginalize the influence of 
OSC oversight, entrusting the practical implementation of disclosure requirements to 
members of the exchange.  Under the Act, legal exemptions in effect corralled broker-dealers 
who continued to operate in the Over-The-Counter market (OTC) within a space subject to 
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state surveillance and regulation.  While this represented an extension of legal authority over 
an element of the junior market, it also delimited intervention by assigning those mining 
stocks listed on exchanges to a space exempt from direct bureaucratic oversight, 
demarcated by assumptions regarding the probity and collective interest of exchange 
members (cf. Barkan 2011).  However, the Windfall report questioned this arrangement and 
highlighted conflicts of interest, arguing the primary distribution of mining issues was no 
longer compatible with the TSE’s function as an exchange.  Countering this, the exchange 
asserted that members’ experience, personal knowledge and professional integrity ensured 
the TSE was in fact guarantor of the public interest.  Surprisingly the provincial regulator 
supported this, arguing that if the distribution of mining securities moved off the exchange 
and onto the OTC market, which the OSC regulated, the market would be open to even more 
manipulation (see Condon 1998, 64-68).    The OSC maintained that the agency would be 
more effective in meeting public policy objectives if granted enhanced powers of oversight of 
self-governing bodies, not the market-making process itself. 
 
Consequently with the passage of a new Securities Act (1966), trust in the capacities of the 
exchange to regulate its members’ market-making activities prevailed.  However the OSC 
was granted new sweeping powers to ensure that the exchange would undertake its 
regulatory responsibilities.  So even though the idea of responsible self-regulation continued 
to prove persuasive, under the new Act the OSC was granted authority to require procedural 
reforms of the exchange and to oversee its disclosure practices, marking a significant 
extension of legal authority.  Even though the OSC moved slowly to exert its new powers, the 
exchange itself did not delay in deferring to the political debates out of which the new 
legislation had emerged.  By the close of the 1960s it had appointed its first non-member 
president, revised rules governing floor trading, introduced a department for market 
surveillance and helped develop an accredited system of national qualifications for market 
professionals (Majury 2007).  Positioning itself as guarantor of ‘the public interest’, the TSE 
also introduced enhanced disclosure requirements, including the production of both a 
preliminary and final prospectus in the course of primary distribution, the publication of 
annual and interim financial statements by issuers, and a requirement that statements on the 
financial position of a listed company be accompanied by an accredited auditor’s judgment.  
Through such initiatives, Ontario’s capital market inched towards a formal system of 
‘continuous’ financial disclosure – the Securities Act (1978) - an ‘evergreen’ circuit of 
standardized financial information, up-dated in a more ‘timely’ fashion, verified by 
professionally accredited auditors. 
 
Mobilizing disclosure in different registers 
 
What at first may have appeared under the new legislation as a straightforward regulatory 
strategy - enhanced disclosure - in practice actually involved elements of judgment that soon 
exercised both the TSE and OSC in adjudications and policy directives.  Although the 
legislation maintained that the OSC should not exercise judgment on the merits of an 
investment (this was for the investing public to do), it did grant the regulator discretionary 
powers to ensure the terms of a purchase advertised within any prospectus were ‘equitable’ 
between parties and that mining promoters were not making ‘unreasonable’ profits at the 
expense of the investor.  Under these provisions, the meaning of ‘disclosure’ proved 
sufficiently malleable to incorporate situated judgments by the OSC and TSE about equity, 
reasonableness and the balancing of harms among investors, mining promoters and issuers.   
Page 10 of 22Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 11 
What was at stake here was the governance of listed firms (specifically the interests of 
corporate insiders vis-à-vis the investing ‘public’) and the market as a whole (in challenging 
market insiders’ power to establish interpretative norms).   
 
Whereas in the 1950s disclosure requirements were narrowly interpreted in terms of 
assisting capital formation and the resource economy, by the late 1960s, under the OSC’s 
direction, fraud prevention began to be reframed in wider terms than solely maintaining ‘the 
well-being’ of mining.  This ‘interpretative turn’ unfolded neither abruptly nor without tension.  
For example, reflecting past practice, in 1968 an enquiry into financing mineral exploration, 
the Beatty Enquiry (OSC 1968), arranged public hearings for representations from 
‘prospectors, developers and others associated with the financing of mining exploration and 
development companies’ but not, significantly, from investors.  Still sympathetic to the 
concerns of mining promoters, the OSC proved willing often to recognize situations where 
public disclosures could cause ‘harm’ to the issuer sufficient to out-weigh any likely 
consequences for shareholders.  However, ceding to industry interests in exercising 
discretion was increasingly countered by instances where the OSC required issuers to 
introduce safeguards intended to ‘balance’ interests, re-shaping governance arrangements.  
‘Disclosure’, it seemed, proved sufficiently pliable to be mobilized in different registers than 
had prevailed in the past (cf. Galison 1997).  Examples include judgments on the number of 
shares that could be underwritten by a speculative mining company (Great Pine Mines in 
OSCB 1966a) and the nature of payments due to promoters upon the sale of their shares 
(Prima in OSCB 1966b), positioning the agency as an advocate for shareholders in 
transactions with promoters.   
 
By the turn of the decade the OSC began putting the idea of disclosure to work to broker a 
more diverse set of interests than had hitherto prevailed.  Tellingly, in Maybrun Mines (OSCB 
1969), the OSC turned down the issuer’s application to be exempted from filing a prospectus, 
arguing ‘we have confined ourselves to considerations of the public interest in the protection 
of the investing public (which is within our jurisdiction) and have excluded considerations of 
the interests of a different and wider public in the discovering and bringing into production of 
new mines (which is outside our jurisdiction)’ (op. cit. 169).  Acknowledging that the public 
interest could be framed in terms other than just the promotion of mineral exploration, this 
judgment signaled a shift in regulatory practice, ultimately encouraging the province’s most 
controversial mining promoters (dubbed ‘stockateers’) to seek out more amenable regulatory 
regimes, such as British Columbia’s ‘venture exchange’ (the Vancouver Stock Exchange) 
(Wells 1991, VSE/BCSC 1994).  Working with a chastened TSE, the OSC sought to shore up 
confidence among investors in the ‘investment image’ of Canada (see Meta Uranium, OSCB 
1967) by increasingly translating a wider array of political claims into the configuration of the 
public and private information flows that constituted Ontario as a space for capital raising 
activities.   
 
Reframing the market: ‘balancing interests’ through ‘disclosure’ 
 
This shift in the practical meaning of disclosure reflected not just the ‘dynamics of profit and 
prudence’, whereby opportunism and legitimacy animate market politics and institutional 
change (Abolafia 1996).  It also reflected a re-configuration of the frame and scale of 
reference of the associated sites and spaces of regulatory practice associated with: Ontario’s 
industrialization and growing ambivalence among an increasingly influential segment of TSE 
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members towards the junior mining sector; changing attitudes towards the influence of 
foreign direct investment on the structure of the country’s development; and a re-appraisal of 
the role of junior mining firms in advancing geological knowledge.   
 
During the 1960s divisions emerged within the TSE between those brokers that specialised 
in promoting speculative mining issues and those who provided services for ‘blue chip’ 
issuers.  With the rapid post-war industrialization of Ontario’s economy, the interests of ‘blue 
chip’ brokers began to hold sway in the governance of the exchange.  Institutional reforms 
implemented after the Windfall scandal ensured mining promoters had less influence in both 
the daily operations of the TSE and the internal regulation of its activities (Armstrong 2001).  
At the same time, by virtue of the province’s economic dynamism relative to the rest of 
Canada, Ontario’s capital markets assumed strategic significance for a wider project of 
national economic development.  By the late 1960s a critique of past reliance on foreign 
direct investment (FDI), in particular American, re-framed resource extraction in terms of 
dependency, and FDI more generally in terms of the immobilization of Canadian 
manufacturing’s innovative capacities (e.g. Canada 1968; Ontario 1971; Canada 1972).  
Foreign control of the economy had, it was argued, ‘arrested’ Canadian industrialization.  
Reframing national economic space in these terms positioned capital formation and the role 
of Ontario’s securities markets at the centre of wider debates about engineering Canadian 
economic development (Clement and Williams 1997).   
 
The political and institutional marginalization of mining promoters was furthered by some who 
questioned long-standing assumptions that junior mining performed a key role in advancing 
knowledge of the country’s geology.  Significant in this respect was Cork’s (1962) brief for a 
federal review of the future of Canadian banking and finance (Canada 1964).  Cork queried 
whether resource development would be impeded if fuller disclosure requirements 
discouraged the flotation of new junior mining issues, citing evidence that 86% of prospecting 
activity in Canada was financed by the majors using retained earnings.  Historically, he 
argued, the majority of commercially significant finds had been discovered by these firms, not 
independent prospectors or ‘juniors’.  Indeed, returns for investors on ‘surface prospecting’, 
the favoured technique of independent prospectors, seemed to be diminishing.  Instead, 
large mining companies, investing in systematic programs of aerial geophysical survey, had 
the means to identify ‘anomalies’ that could be subjected to further targeted ground-level 
testing and sampling.   
 
By the 1970s one OSC study was bold enough to publically question ‘junior mining’s’ very 
purpose.  It reported that only a relatively small proportion of money raised through the sale 
of shares was actually spent on exploration activities.  Typically just 40% went to the 
company’s treasury, whereas 11% went to the underwriter-promoter and 49% to the broker-
dealers who marketed the stock.  The study concluded that ‘involving broker-dealers in the 
raising of funds for junior exploration is like sending the fox to feed the chickens’ (quoted by 
Armstrong 2001, 277).  This re-appraisal gained force as Ontario’s legislature formalized the 
OSC’s legal authority over the affairs of the markets’ self-governing bodies and the OSC 
exercised its powers to define ‘disclosure’ in terms other than just securing finance to 
develop the province’s resource economy.  With this the notion of ‘the investor’ to be 
protected in governmental discourse shifted from patriotic risk-takers (who were to be given 
‘a fair run for their money’) to the prudent saver, whose confidence in investing in Canada 
could be secured through enhanced compliance by issuers and interpretative acts by the 
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OSC and TSE in ‘balancing interests’ (cf. O’Malley 2004).  Consequently, the practical 
meaning of ‘disclosure’ pivoted increasingly around the perceived impact of speculative 
mining finance on the ability of other Canadian industrial sectors to raise share capital, re-
working its frame and scale of reference, informed in important ways by a wider politics of 
market making and statecraft.   
 
Uncertainty, enterprise and governing knowledge 
 
In the introduction to this paper it was noted that the speculative nature of financing mineral 
exploration in part stems from how the physical qualities of specific geological phenomenon 
can disrupt commodification processes.  As the Windfall Oils and Mines scandal illustrated, 
mining promoters have proven adept at exploiting in an entrepreneurial fashion the 
provisional nature of geological knowledge.  Consequently, a perennial problem for investors 
has been handling not just the indeterminacy of scientific claims, but also the social basis of 
associated epistemic practices (Schaffer 2002).  Entrepreneurs who start up and provide the 
initial backing for exploration firms typically draw upon past experience gained as a geologist, 
engineer or promoter in the mining sector.  As such, the line that distinguishes different forms 
of expertise is thin, as investment opportunities must be explained in geologically convincing 
terms.  Since ‘profit must be imagined before it can be extracted’ (Tsing 2000, 118) in such 
ventures, handling the indeterminacy of prospectors’ knowledge claims within public 
disclosures is fraught with conflicts of interest.  However, as Ontario’s financial reporting 
practices were being re-worked during the 1960s and 1970s, regulators continued to rely 
upon quite basic, industry-led practices to govern the reporting of scientific claims, that is, 
technical disclosure.  It was not until the 1990s, with the collapse of Bre-X (a gold 
prospecting firm working in Indonesia), that the quantity, qualities and timeliness of technical 
disclosure and the associated institutional basis of warrant became sufficiently politicized to 
prompt regulators to re-evaluate the implicit trust they and the public had vested in technical 
information.  
 
Technical disclosures introduced under the Securities Act (1945), subsection 43(5), were 
basic: a property’s known history; means of access; the character, extent and condition of 
the development; and a description of any work done by its present management.  Over time, 
these requirements were added to.  From 1949 a report’s author had to demonstrate that he 
or she was exercising independent judgment, having no financial interest in its reception.  By 
1956 a map of the property had to be included (Frohberg 1960).  However, terminology 
remained ill defined and loosely applied.  It was not until the introduction by the OSC in 1967 
of Form 11 that reporting of estimates of mineralization was first codified.  This linked 
deposits that might be mined and sold at a profit, ‘ores’, to a classification agreed by the 
Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario (PEO) in 1963.  Adopting the industry’s 
norms (cf. Dashwood 2007), Form 11 translated degrees of geologic assurance into 
marketable financial risk, tethering the system of warrant to conventions fashioned through 
the training and experience of PEO members (Hoover  1909; Blondel and Laskey 1956, PEO 
1963).  This effectively displaced ethical considerations from questions of trust, embedding 
trust within technical expertise.  This approach was rolled out nationally under National Policy 
(NP) 2-A (CSA 1971) and NP 22 (CSA 1983).  By the 1980s other jurisdictions, led by the 
United States, began to qualify ‘economic feasibility’ further in terms of technological, legal, 
environmental and political contingencies (McKelvey 1972; USBM/USGS 1980; SEC 1992).  
However, Canadian regulators retained the PEO system, offering mining promoters greater 
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latitude in the sorts of knowledge claims that could circulate within technical disclosures 
(Micon 1998). 
 
The uneven use of terminology for technical reporting purposes internationally helped sustain 
Canada’s reputation as a favorable environment within which to raise finance for junior 
mining.  This assumed particular significance as the mineral prospecting and extractive 
industries globally embarked upon complex and far-reaching changes during the 1980s.  
Incremental innovations in the technology of exploration cumulatively delivered dramatic 
reductions in costs.  In addition advances in data processing drove a shift in methodologies 
from traditional approaches that make reference to regional analogues towards a new 
emphasis on modeling basic principles (Bridge and Wood 2005).  To a degree this 
undermined the value of place-based, regionally specific geological knowledge accumulated 
over time and opened up opportunities for new entrants to apply their expertise in distant 
countries and unfamiliar environments.  In parallel with this, new opportunities were created 
for mining firms to apply these techniques overseas with the liberalisation of investment 
regimes and mineral exploration laws in many developing countries (Otto 1997; Bridge 2008; 
Emel and Huber 2008).  While mergers and acquisitions increased the controlling influence 
of large multinational integrated companies within the sector, growth in out-sourcing of up-
stream activities, coupled with falling exploration costs, sustained an increasing number of 
small and medium-sized junior firms listed in Canada, but committed to overseas exploration.   
 
Amidst these structural changes within the mining industry globally, the Bre-X scandal 
dramatically exposed fragilities within the system of metrology with which geological ‘facts’ 
were produced and circulated  within the juniors’ market (Gould 1998; Wells 1999; Tsing 
2000; 2005).  In 1994 Bre-X announced assay results from drill cores it had taken in Busang, 
East Kalimantan.  This prospecting claim had previously been abandoned by a senior 
Australian firm, however Bre-X claimed its own drill team had discovered a major gold 
deposit.  Fuelled by speculation circulating on digital media, its share price climbed from 
$0.51 (Canadian) in 1993 to a peak of $286.50 by 1996.  With a market capitalisation of over 
$6 billion, Bre-X was inter-listed both the TSE and NASDAQ.  However, additional assays 
undertaken the following year by a senior American firm which was in the process of 
brokering a partnership, found nothing of commercial value in Bre-X’s samples.  Indeed, 
evidence suggested the cores had been ‘salted’ with stream-rounded alluvial gold.  This 
scandal prompted the OSC and TSE to establish the Mining Standards Task Force to 
enquire into the disclosure issues Bre-X and other contemporaneous mining scandals raised.  
These frauds included not only salting of cores, but also unreliable proprietary sample 
preparation and assay methods, mis-representations of visual field estimates as drilling 
results, overly optimistic geological reports and even, occasionally, human error.   
 
The Task Force’s recommendations (TSE/OSC 1999) were implemented under National 
Instrument (NI) 43-101 - Standards of Disclosure for Mineral Projects (CSA 2001) – replacing 
NP 2-A and NP 22. As in the past, measures were justified as necessary to shore up 
confidence in Canadian capital markets and promote economic development.  However, 
whereas previous disclosure regimes were framed in terms of the relative significance of 
prospectors in producing wealth within Canada (i.e. debate over Canada as a ‘resource 
economy’), these reforms were framed in terms of Canada as a ‘knowledge-based economy’ 
(OECD 1996; Gertler and Wolfe 2004; Jones et al. 2005) and support for the export of 
expertise in mining finance, mineral exploration, assaying and mine development.  At the 
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heart of the reforms it devised were strategies to formalise, institutionalise and re-scale the 
system of warrant by which scientific claims can be assessed by investors.  This involved 
accommodating the globally distanciated connectivities and informational flows that now 
characterise significant elements of the junior mining sector in Canada, putting in place 
market infrastructure that recognises and works with the micro-orders of industry practices, 
the contingent relations that constitute ‘value’ across diverse sites of exploration, and foreign 
regimes of reporting and valuation.  In doing so, NI 43-101 drew upon regulatory strategies 
forged earlier in relation to the disclosure of financial information: trust was formally vested in 
self-governing bodies, industry expertise, and the generative power of ‘disclosure’ (cf. Levi-
Faur 2005, Riles 2011).   
 
Firstly, the legislation formally tasked a self-governing body of professionals, the Canadian 
Institute of Mining, Metalurgy and Petroleum (CIM), with revising Canada’s system for 
classifying commercially significant deposits (NP 2-A).  Illustrative of the structural couplings 
that now bind together international economic actors within this element of the ‘knowledge 
economy’ (Teubner 1992; Dezalay and Garth 2002), CIM was required to work with the 
national reserve committees of Australia, South Africa, UK, Chile and USA to establish a 
framework for translating Canadian practice into common terminology, standardised 
definitions and ‘best practice’ guidelines (CIM 2000; 2005; 2010).  The standards CIM 
devised and Canadian regulators recognized do not impose some arbitrary, internationally 
benchmarked, form of precision.  Rather, they work with the indeterminacy of scientific 
knowledge claims, creating a space in which situated legal understandings of ‘fairness’ can 
frame epistemic practices, deploying notions of ‘reasonableness’ in judgments about 
‘economic feasibility’ and ‘value’. 
 
Secondly, NI 43-101 restricted authorship of a technical disclosure to those who could verify 
they were ‘competent’ to make such judgments on the economic significance of geological 
‘facts’.  ‘Competency’ was defined in terms of professional accreditation as a ‘geoscientist’ or 
‘engineer’ and at least 5 years of relevant industry experience.  In formally anchoring the 
notion of ‘competent person’ to Canadian self-governing professional bodies, these 
institutions were required to ensure there was provision for ‘public welfare’ in their codes of 
ethics and associated disciplinary mechanisms.  At the same time, securities regulators 
established a system for vetting and recognizing the expertise and governance 
arrangements of foreign accrediting professional bodies.  In extending their authority through 
the formal recognition of accrediting bodies, Canadian regulators delegated practical 
responsibility for regulating the production and circulation of scientific claims to a rule of 
experts, constituted through a globalising network of self-governing associations of 
professional engineers and geoscientists (Mitchell 2002; O’Neill 2002).  Given the provisional 
nature of prospectors’ knowledge, where uncertainty is the norm, private regimes of self-
regulation have been formally drawn into regulatory strategies to handle the social basis of 
epistemic practices.   
 
Finally, the legislation also mandated disclosing the provenance of scientific data, including 
details of the identity of the assay laboratory, its relationship to the mining company and 
whether its processes met international standards established under ISO/IEC Guide 25 (ISO 
1990).  Requiring the public dissemination of information on the institutional geographies of 
devices, individuals, organizations and sites of scientific testing and evaluation, serves a 
ritual function (Power 1999).  It assumes the ‘value’ of scientific data is best secured through 
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the demands that traceability place on market participants to exercise ‘reasonable 
expectations’ and foresight (O’Malley 2004 in contrast with Beck 1992), holding the brokers 
of knowledge to account, and echoing earlier arguments made by legal realists with regards 
to financial disclosure. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
If we accept, as Boeckler and Berndt have argued, that “a world ‘after markets’ will only 
emerge on the terrain of ‘markets’ themselves” (2012, 1), then it is incumbent to understand 
what holds particular market orders in place.  As Boeckler and Berndt provocatively go on to 
ask, ‘what is it that holds neoliberalism in place even though its core principle, that is self-
regulated markets, has itself proven to be a failure?’ (p.2).  In tracing the application of the 
legal concept of ‘disclosure’ and shifts evident in its practical application, this paper has 
argued that ‘economics’, though necessary for the construction of markets, is by no means 
sufficient.  Analytical emphasis on the work of ‘economics’ within ‘the performative turn’ (e.g. 
MacKenzie 2001, Caliskan and Callon 2009; 2010) tends to under-estimate the significance 
of the ‘methods of control and trials of strength’ (Mitchell 2007, 245) that are routinely 
mobilized in market-making processes, steering reflective human cognition and action (Stark 
2009).  The power of legal knowledge practices, such as ‘disclosure’, stems not from self-
executing capacities to govern markets, but rather from their polyvalent qualities.  ‘Disclosure’ 
may appear as a technical given, however as the case study illustrates, divergent 
understandings and commitments towards the idea circulate.  Since its introduction to 
address ‘the Canadian problem’, the practical significance of disclosure as a regulatory 
technique has been reframed in terms of: firstly, the well-being of Ontario’s resource 
economy; then, wider processes of Canadian industrialization; and finally, promoting 
Canadian ‘knowledge industries’ within the global economy.  Each shift in interpretational 
practice attempted to codify and shape the circulation of information deemed by regulators 
as ‘material’ to the valuation of shares.  These practices drew upon a liberal ‘imaginary of 
entrepreneurial calculation that is pragmatic and situational, rather than abstract or 
quantifiable’ (O’Malley 2004, 92).  Given the implications of associated judgments for the 
governance of junior mining firms, the markets they listed on and the type of economy they 
helped put in motion, it is clear that there is a political economy to the geographies of 
knowledge dissemination within markets, differentially empowering different types of 
stakeholders (Rittich 2005; Hess 2007; Dhir 2009). 
 
This argument also has bearing for our understanding of the re-scaling of economic 
regulation associated with globalization and the emergence of sectoral regimes of 
transnational authority.  Sassen (2009) has characterized such emergent sectoral regimes as 
‘transversal borderings’, ‘chipping away’ at what historically has been constructed as the 
authority of state institutions and actors per se.  However, as this case study evidences, 
claims about the novelty of the extension of market-like rule through the generation of norms, 
rule-making and efforts to ‘enhance’ self-regulatory capacities in the shadow of the state, 
often fail to consider how the re-configuration of markets under globalization is predicated 
upon liberal legal regimes and a long history of states granting legal privileges to promote 
and maintain particular regimes of accumulation (see Barkan 2011).  Work invested by 
Canadian regulators to convince investors to ‘trust the numbers’, to enable them to 
distinguish between ‘productive’ and destructive’ forms of financial speculation, has entailed 
working closely with private regimes of self-regulation and been framed by wider strategies of 
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statecraft.  The knowledge practices that channel and bind associated market-led 
governance arrangements are ‘creatures and creations of grounded processes of institutional 
reproduction, regimes of discursive framings and contours of political power’ (Peck 2011, 
793), and as such, are transformed by their journeys across sectors and over space.  This 
raises as a matter for enquiry how the situated rationalities that make distinctions between 
‘knowing things’ and ‘knowing people’ (Schaffer 2002), ‘value’ and ‘values’ (Thevenot 2009), 
‘market economies’ and ‘moral economies’ (Sayer 2007; Tsing 2009), come to delineate 
particular geographies of marketization and a wider politics of calculation. 
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